Game theory for data science : eliciting truthful information /

Intelligent systems often depend on data provided by information agents, for example, sensor data or crowdsourced human computation. Providing accurate and relevant data requires costly effort that agents may not always be willing to provide. Thus, it becomes important not only to verify the correct...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Faltings, Boi (Author), Radanovic, Goran (Author)
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: [San Rafael, California] : Morgan & Claypool Publishers, [2017]
[San Rafael, California] : Morgan & Claypool, 2017
Series:Synthesis digital library of engineering and computer science
Synthesis lectures on artificial intelligence and machine learning ; #35
Synthesis lectures on artificial intelligence and machine learning ; #35
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Summary:Intelligent systems often depend on data provided by information agents, for example, sensor data or crowdsourced human computation. Providing accurate and relevant data requires costly effort that agents may not always be willing to provide. Thus, it becomes important not only to verify the correctness of data, but also to provide incentives so that agents that provide high-quality data are rewarded while those that do not are discouraged by low rewards. We cover different settings and the assumptions they admit, including sensing, human computation, peer grading, reviews, and predictions. We survey different incentive mechanisms, including proper scoring rules, prediction markets and peer prediction, Bayesian Truth Serum, Peer Truth Serum, Correlated Agreement, and the settings where each of them would be suitable. As an alternative, we also consider reputation mechanisms. We complement the game-theoretic analysis with practical examples of applications in prediction platforms, community sensing, and peer grading
Item Description:Part of: Synthesis digital library of engineering and computer science
Physical Description:1 PDF (xv, 135 pages)
1 online resource ( xv, 135 pages) : illustrations
Also available in print
Format:Mode of access: World Wide Web
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references (pages 127-133)
ISBN:1627056084
9781627056083
ISSN:1939-4616 ;
Access:Abstract freely available; full-text restricted to subscribers or individual document purchasers
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