Neither brain nor ghost : a nondualist alternative to the mind-brain identity theory /

In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Rockwell, W. Teed (Author)
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2005
Cambridge, Massachusetts : The MIT Press, [2005]
Series:Bradford book
Subjects:
Table of Contents:
  • 1 Minds, Brains, and Behavior 1
  • Functionalism 3
  • Eliminative Materialism 4
  • Some Cartesian Materialist Presuppositions 9
  • Ryle's Dispositional Psychology 11
  • A Rylean Alternative to Functionalist Cartesian Materialism 12
  • 2 Beyond the Cranium 21
  • 3 Beyond the Neuronal Mind 37
  • The James-Cannon Debate 37
  • New Data on the Relationship between the Body and Emotions/Sensations 39
  • Is Causation Different from Embodiment? 44
  • 4 Causation and Embodiment 51
  • Mill's Criticism of Atomistic Causality 51
  • The Lure of Atomistic Causality 55
  • Mill's Criticism (and the Modern Defense) of Intrinsic Causal Powers 59
  • 5 The Myth of the Autonomous Mind-Brain 65
  • Supervenience, Causation, and Embodiment 69
  • 6 Experience, Sense Data, and Language: Putting Experience Back into the Environment 83
  • Language and Thought as Biological and Functional Categories 90
  • Subjective Experience and the Environment 97
  • Minds, Worlds, and Reality 101
  • 7 The Return of the Zombies 111
  • Why Physiological Zombies Have Scientific Significance 113
  • Functional and Behavioral Zombies 115
  • The Roots of the Problem 117
  • Zombies, Experience, and Skepticism 118
  • 8 The "Frame Problem" and the "Background" 135
  • Searle versus Dewey 141
  • Searle's Intrinsicality Argument 141
  • Searle's Darwinian Argument 146
  • Dennett's Darwinian Argument: Genes versus Memes 149
  • Dreyfus, Clark, and Conscious Experience 154
  • 9 Dreams, Illusions, and Errors 161
  • Cartesian Materialism and the Empiricists 162
  • The Pragmatist Alternative 164
  • Bridge Laws versus New Wave Reductionism 167
  • The Pragmatic Answer to Eliminative Skepticism 169
  • Connectionist Support for Pragmatism 174
  • 10 Dewey and the Dynamic Alternative 177
  • The Traditional View of Neural Nets 183
  • A Brief Introduction to DST 192
  • Thelen and Smith on Infant Locomotor Development 196
  • Freeman and the Attractor Landscape of the Olfactory Brain 199
  • How Animals Move 201
  • Dynamic Systems as Behavioral Fields 204
  • 1 Minds, brains, and behavior
  • 2. Beyond the cranium
  • 3. Beyond the neuronal mind
  • 4. Causation and embodiment
  • 5. The myth of the autonomous mind¿brain
  • 6. Experience, sense data, and language : putting experience back into the environment
  • 7. The return of the zombies
  • 8. The "frame problem" and the "background"
  • 9. Dreams, illusions, and errors
  • 10. Dewey and the dynamic alternative.